We show that any countable N0-categorical theory without finite models has a model companion (which is also Nocategorical). We find the model companions for all x0-categorical abelian groups, and conclude with some remarks on the Njcategorical case.
Introduction.
The main objective of this paper is to prove that any countable «"-categorical theory K without finite models has a model companion (which is also «"-categorical).
We recall that K' is a model companion of K if K and K' are theories in the same first-order language, K' is model complete, and A-and K' are mutually model consistent, i.e. any model of K can be embedded in a model of K' and vice versa. (Model completeness is discussed in [5] ; model companions are introduced in [1] .) This concept is a generalization of that of model completion [5] ; K' is a model completion of K if Ki extends K, any model of K can be embedded in a model of K', and for any model A of K and models B1, B2 of K' such that /!<=/?, and A<=B2, we have (/?,, a)aeA = {B2, a)aeA, i.e. /?, and B2 are elementarily equivalent in a language which has constants for all the elements of A. A model completion of K is, of course, a model companion of K, but a theory may have a model companion without having a model completion. We remark that a model companion, when it exists, is unique up to equivalence: any two model companions of K have the same models (see, for example, [1, Theorem 5.3] ).
If to the assumptions on K indicated in the first paragraph we add the requirement that K be inductive, i.e. that the union of any chain of models of K be itself a model of K, then K is itself already model complete, by a result of Lindstrom [4, p. 189] . However if K is not assumed inductive then under the given hypotheses AT need not even have a model completion. Consider, for example, the case where K0 is the familiar set of axioms for the concept of a densely ordered set with (say) last element but no first element. Then K0 is X0-categorical by the familiar back-and-forth argument of Cantor, and the theory K'0 of densely ordered sets without first or last elements is a model companion for K. But since K'0 does not extend K0, the uniqueness result mentioned above implies that K0 has no model completion.
In relinquishing inductivity we give up a very useful model theoretic property; it is nice to know that we still get a model companion, even if not a model completion.
Preliminaries.
The general framework in which we shall work is that of infinite forcing in model theory; we assume familarity with [6] . Let 2 denote the class of all substructures of models of K, equivalently the class of all models of ÂV, the set of universal consequences of K. Robinson defines a relation "A forces 0" between elements A of 2 and sentences 0 defined in A, as follows, by induction on the structure of 0 : (v) A forces "10 iff for no B in 2 which extends A is it the case that B forces 0.
We say that A weakly forces 0 iff no extension of A in 2 forces 10. If 0 is defined in A, this is equivalent to saying that A forces T10.
A structure A in 2 is said to be generic if for any 0 defined in A, A¥6 iff A forces 0. Using the fact that 2 is inductive it can be shown [6, Theorem 2.4] that any A e 2 has an extension 2?e2 which is generic; since it is immediate by properties of forcing that if A and B are generic and A <= B then A <£, we see that if K' is a set of sentences having precisely the generic structures as its models, then K' is a model companion for K.
The following special case of a theorem of Robinson [6] will enable us to find such a K' for our X0-categoricai K. We have used Coven's characterization of genericity instead of the definition-i.e. weak forcing instead of forcing-in order to be able to apply the special case of Robinson's theorem. If we were to use forcing, we would have to resort to the general form of Robinson's theorem, for 6 not necessarily a negation; but then the resulting 0' 's would have additional quantifiers in them, which would cause difficulties with our proof.
To replace the infinitary axiomatization (*) by a first-order one we will (not surprisingly) use the following result on «"-categorical theories.
Theorem (Ryll-Nardjewski).
Let K be a complete countable theory without finite models. Then the following are equivalent:
(ii) For each n, K has only finitely many n-types. (iii) For each n, every n-type in K is principal.
For the relevant definitions and a proof of the theorem see [9, p. 91] . Using this we will show that within K (110)'(x,, • • • , x") is equivalent to a first-order formula. Then we will use the relationship between K and its forcing companion KF (the set of sentences in the language of K which hold in all generic structures) to transfer this equivalence to KF, and this will yield the finitary axiomatization K'.
We will define K' to include KF, but it will follow from the definition of KF and the fact that K' axiomatizes the class of generic structures that in fact K' = KF. This is in accordance with Theorem 5.4 of [6], which implies that the model companion of A", if it exists, must be logically equivalent to KF.
3. The main results. Theorem 1. Let K be a countable ^-categorical theory with no finite models. K has a model companion.
Proof.
As indicated above, we will show that the infinitary axiomatization Clearly 0* satisfies our claim. Next we claim that the equivalence between 1(110)' and 0* transfers from K to KF. To see this we observe that if A is any model of K* then there exists a model B of K with A <= B such that A is existentially complete in B, i.e. any existential sentence with constants from A which holds in B holds already in A. The existence of such a B follows from the fact, established in [6] , that every universal-existential consequence of A" is a consequence of KF, either by a standard ultraproduct construction or by direct appeal to Theorem 3. This completes the proof; we reiterate that A' = AF, so that KF is model complete.
Corollary.
If K\ is mutually model consistent with a theory K2 which is ^-categorical and has no finite models (and is in the same countable language as K^), then A, has a model companion.
Proof.
If A, and A2 are mutually model consistent then KF =KF (see [6, Theorem 3.10]), and K2 is model complete by the theorem.
We observe that in the situation of Theorem 1, the model companion is also «"-categorical:
Theorem 2. 777e model companion K' of a countable ^-categorical theory K without finite models is H0-categorical.
Since K is complete by the Los-Vaught theorem, it has the joint embedding property, so K' is complete [6, Theorem 4.4] . Also since for any « the sentence 3xj • • • ixJ A Xi^xA is a theorem of K, it is a theorem of K', so K' has no finite models. Therefore by the Ryll-Nardjewski theorem it suffices to show that for each « there are only finitely many «-types in K'. Since K' is model complete every «-type in K' is determined by its existential formulas. Given any such type S form S" by adding to the set of existential formulas in S, for each existential <p not in S, a universal formula logically equivalent to Itp. Any S" is realized in a model A of K' and hence (as in the proof of Theorem 1) in a model B of K such that A^B and A is existentially complete in B. Hence S' can be extended to a complete type in K. Now if SX¿¿S2 then S[ contains a formula logically equivalent to the negation of a formula in S2, so Sx and S2 extend to different types in K. Since there are only finitely many «-types in K, this implies that there are only finitely many «-types S in K'.
4. An example. As an illustration of Theorem 1, we find the model companions for all S0-categorical abelian groups.
A group G is said to be X0-categorical if Th(C7) is N0-cateogrical. In [7] Rosenstein proves that an abelian group is ^"-categorical iff it is of bounded order, i.e. there is a bound on the orders of its elements. Our existence theorem then says that for any abelian group G of bounded order, Th(G) has a model companion. (If G is finite Th(G) is clearly model complete, so we assume that G is infinite, so that Th(G) has no finite models.) It is easy to see that the model companion of Th(G) is a theory of abelian groups of bounded order and is X0-categorical; in fact in this case the N0-categoricity is clear without Theorem 2, because the model companion is complete and is therefore the theory of any of its models, which is X0-categorical by Rosenstein's result. So we are claiming that to any such G we can associate a countable abelian group m.c.(G) of bounded order, unique up to isomorphism, such that the model companion of Th( (7) As a check we can show directly that Th(H) is in fact model complete for H of the special form described above, by showing that Th(H) is inductive and using the result of Lindstrom referred to in §1.
Another illustration of Theorem 1 is obtained by observing that for any infinite «"-categorical linear ordering S, Th(5) has as its model companion the theory of dense linear order without endpoints. The required model consistency can be established by using the characterization of «"-categorical linear orderings given by Rosenstein in [8].
5. Some remarks on the «,-categorical case. If in Theorem 1 we replace «"-categoricity by «^categoricity, then we can draw the conclusion that the class of generic structures can be axiomatized in LWi<0, the extension of first-order logic obtained by allowing the formation of countable conjunctions and disjunctions. (For information on La m see [3] .) For we otherwise we can assume that for any disjunct Keip ("Wto, ■■■ ,xn) the set {(110)?(x,, • • • , x")} is precisely the set of all existential formulas which hold at ax, ■ ■ ■ , an in some model A of KF which weakly forces 6(ax, • • • , an). Then by using the device of extending to a model B of K such that A is existentially complete in B, as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can conclude that if there were uncountably many different disjuncts there would be uncountably many «-types in K, contradicting its Xj-categoricity [10] .
